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KSR Fallout: Questions of Law Based on
Findings of Fact and the Continuing Problem
of Hindsight Bias
by ADAM POWELL*
I. Introduction
KSR v. Teleflex marked the Supreme Court's first significant
return to the question of patent "obviousness"-which is used to
ensure patents are not improvidently granted to inevitable
inventions-in over four decades.2 If a jury finds an invention would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made, the court is likely to find the patent invalid.' The
changes mandated by KSR to non-obviousness determinations
provide the opportunity to adjust jury instructions in order to address
existing problems in non-obviousness law.
Prior to the KSR decision, in Graham v. John Deere the Court
set forth general standards for a jury to consider in deciding whether
a patent is obvious.4 In response to the requirements established by
Graham, the Federal Circuit developed the "teaching, suggestion, or
motivation" test ("TSM test") as a method of determining whether
inventions were "obvious" at the time of the application for a patent,
and therefore invalid.! However, over time courts began to apply the
standard too mechanically, leading the Court in KSR to strike down

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2010; B.S.
Chemical Engineering, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2007. The author would
like to thank Professor Robin Feldman of U.C. Hastings and Lynn Pasahow of Fenwick &
West LLP, Mountain View, Calif., for advising him on this Note.
1. Michael H. Davis, PatentPolitics,56 S.C. L. REV. 337,351 (2004).
2. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
4. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
5. See High Court's Patent Ruling on Obviousness Was Not Paradigm Shift, Judges
Agree, 74 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 690 (2007) [hereinafter Paradigm

Shift].
[243]
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the rigid application of the TSM test and mandate a more flexible
standard.'
The requirements of KSR may make it easier to invalidate a
patent by a finding of obviousness, but the decision does not present
any clear indication as to how lower courts will implement the
decision or what substantive changes the decision will introduce to
obviousness determinations. Very few courts have modified their
published jury instructions in view of KSR.' Additionally, studies
show most courts utilize a "black box" jury verdict form that does not
require the jury to make any specific factual findings with regard to
the Graham factors. 9 Only the Northern District of California
explicitly adopted a new model jury instruction and jury verdict
form.1
The Supreme Court did not clearly define a new test and left
non-obviousness law unsettled. The resulting uncertainty presents an
opportunity to rethink the jury's role and to adjust jury instructions in
order to resolve problems endemic in obviousness decisions for
decades. Adjusting jury instructions and jury verdict forms should
address the problem of hindsight bias-the tendency for people who
6. KSR, 550 U.S. at 427.
7. ParadigmShift, supra note 5 (contrasting the Federal Circuit Chief Judge Michel's
interpretation of KSR's implications with former Judge Roderick R. McKelvie of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware and Senior Judge Thomas S. Ellis of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia).
8. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions
(Civil Cases), available at http://www.call.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/civjury.pdf, pp.
386-87 (last visited Nov. 2, 2008); U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Pattern Jury
Instructions
in
Civil
Cases,
available
at
http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/
juryinstructions/2006civil.doc, § 9.5 (last visited Nov. 2, 2008); United States District Court
for the District of Delaware, Uniform Jury Instructions for Patent Cases, available at
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/jury/Patent%20Jury%201nstructions.pdf, § 4.8 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2008); U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Model Patent
Jury
Instructions,
available
at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/CAND/
FAQ.nsf/60126b66e42d004888256d4e007bce29/4b43c2137e17e03a88257393007bac13/$FIL
E/NDModel.nov07.pdf, pg. 32-38; American Intellectual Property Law Association,
Model
Patent
Jury
Instructions,
available at, http://www.aipla.org/Content/
ContentGroups/Publicationsl/Guide to ModelPatentJuryInstructions.htm#Obviousne
ss (last visited Nov. 2, 2008); Federal Circuit Bar Association, Model Patent Jury
Instructions, § 4.3b, pg. 43-51 (updated Jan. 2008), available at, http://www.
memberconnections.com/olc/pub/LVFC/cpages/misc/purchase-resources.jsp (last visited,
Dec. 12, 2008).
9. William F. Lee, Lauren B. Fletcher, and Gabriel Taran, Reflections on the
Ongoing Role of Juries in Determining Obviousness In Patent Cases After the Supreme
Court'sDecision in KSR, 76 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 1870 (2008).
10. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Model Patent Jury
Instructions, supra note 8.
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know the outcome to believe falsely that they would have predicted
it." This paper will identify proposed jury instructions acceptable
under KSR. It will then suggest why adopting a jury instruction
requiring the jury to articulate findings of fact in a special verdict
form will satisfy the requirements of KSR as well as create the added
benefit of reducing hindsight bias.
Part I of this paper will examine early non-obviousness decisions,
the Graham factors, and the Federal Circuit's TSM test. Part II will
analyze the Supreme Court's decision in KSR, discuss post-KSR
cases, and address summary judgment issues. Part III will discuss
current model jury instructions and jury verdict forms. Finally, Part
IV will discuss the jury's continuing role in non-obviousness decisions,
the problems associated with hindsight bias, and how to address these
concerns.

II. Early Non-Obviousness Decisions, the Graham Factors,
and the TSM Test
The first Supreme Court test for obviousness required that the
invention demonstrate a minimum level of "skill and ingenuity."12 In
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court held that an improved method of
making doorknobs using clay rather than wood or metal was obvious
because it did not exhibit enough skill and ingenuity.13 In 1952
Congress codified the non-obviousness doctrine, establishing that:
A patent may not be obtained ...if the differences between the

subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary
14
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Combination patents, where all the elements exist in the prior art
and the only "invention" is the combination, present unique
difficulties to trial and appellate courts.) In response, the Supreme

11. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 305,
305 (1988).
12. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248,267 (1851).
13. Id.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
15. See Tamir Packin, Note: A New Test for Obviousness in Combination Patents:
Economic Energy, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 964-65 (2006).
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Court developed the "synergy" test.16 Using this test, claims were
obvious if the combination of existing elements did not achieve any
surprising result because the combination did not do anything
different than the parts did alone. 17 In Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. the
Supreme Court elaborated on the "synergy" test by holding that an
invention, which provided more efficient results but failed to do
anything new, was obvious in light of the prior art.i Generally, the
"synergy" test was problematic because it required a completely
different standard for combination patents.'9
A. The Supreme Court's Attempt at Clarity: the Graham Factors
In an attempt to clarify non-obviousness law, the Supreme Court
established more general standards of obviousness in Graham v. John
Deere Co. 2" In Graham, the Court provided three primary factors to
consider: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue, and (3) the level of
ordinary skill in the art.2" In addition to these factors, the Court
indicated several secondary considerations, including "commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc."22 Other
courts have
added further secondary considerations to the Graham
factors .2
Because the Graham factors are inherently factual in nature,
district courts leave the question of obviousness for the jury, but
review the legal conclusions in a motion for judgment as a matter of
law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). District courts
decide motions for judgment as a matter of law by determining
whether a• reasonable
jury could find in favor of the party opposing
24
the motion. On review, an appellate court reviews legal questions

16. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152

(1950).
17.

Id.

18. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
19. Packin, supranote 15 at 980.
20.

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).

21. Id.
22. Id. at 17-18.
23. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (whether the invention
demonstrated unexpected results); In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124, 1127 (C.C.P.A. 1977)

(whether others had previously attempted and failed to make the invention).
24. LNP EngineeringPlastics Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills Inc., 275 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
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without deference and the findings of fact for substantial evidence. 25
While this system appears to strike a balance between the legal
questions and the underlying factual inquiry, critics claim that nonobviousness decisions are a purely legal question and solely within the
province of the court. 2' Furthermore, while Graham provided
guidance, courts still struggled without a clearer test to offer the jury.
B. The Federal Circuit's Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation Test
To provide a clearer and more easily administered test to the
jury, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals-the
predecessor to the Federal Circuit-set forth the teaching, suggestion,
or motivation test, which brings into consideration whether the prior
art demonstrated a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
known elements.2 Shortly after the Federal Circuit's establishment, it
abandoned the "synergy" test completely.8 While the announcement
of the TSM test predated the Graham decision, the Federal Circuit
retained the TSM test because it viewed it as a way of carrying out the
Graham factors. 29 However, the Federal Circuit eventually applied
the test as a rigid, mechanical formula for determining patent
obviousness. 3°
Critics attacked the "synergy" test as too strict and the TSM test
as too liberal.' Shortly before KSR, the Federal Circuit recognized,
in Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., that courts applied the TSM test
too rigidly and that the standard required more flexibility. In Alza
Corp. the court stated that "[t]here is flexibility in our obviousness
jurisprudence because a motivation may be found implicitly in the
prior art. ' , 33 The court also stated that it "does not have a rigid test
that requires an actual teaching to combine before concluding that
one of ordinary skill in the art would know to combine references.""
25. Dippin Dots Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing LNP
EngineeringPlastics Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills Inc., 275 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
26. See Brief of Cisco Systems, Inc. et al as Amici Curaie in Support of Reversal, KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), at 9-10.
27. In re Bergel, 48 C.C.P.A. 1102, 1105 (1961).
28. Chore-Time Equipment Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
29. ParadigmShift, supra note 5.
30. Al-Site Corp. v. VSIInt'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
31. Packin, supra, note 15 at 975.
32. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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This decision indicates that the Federal Circuit may have moved away
from the rigid application of the TSM test on its own volition.
However, it also may have stemmed from the Supreme Court's
decision to grant certiorari in KSR.
III. Conflicting Interpretations of KSR and Judicial Discretion
The Supreme Court's decision in KSR was open ended and
provided no clear test. Accordingly, it has left much to interpretation
and has provided the Federal Circuit with considerable opportunity
to shape the future of non-obviousness law. As a result, the decision
has introduced substantial uncertainty in obviousness litigation, as
well as instigating conflicting views on what changes to jury
instructions are now mandated by the decision.
A. The KSR Decision
In KSR, the Supreme Court overturned the Federal Circuit's
decision to uphold a patent exclusively licensed to Teleflex. The
patent at suit related to a gas pedal that, instead of mechanically
actuating fuel and air valves in an automobile, provided an electric
signal to a computer that would then open or close the valves.6 The
district court found that it was obvious to combine a traditional pedal
with a modular sensor providing an electric signal to a computer.
The Federal Circuit applied the strict TSM test and reversed the
district court's obviousness determination.
On review, the Supreme Court held that while the Federal
Circuit's TSM test provided "helpful insight," courts should not apply
the TSM test rigidly.39 While applying the TSM test did not depart
from Graham, the Federal Circuit erred by applying it rigidly without
other considerations which could supply the link between prior art
references. 4 ' Thus, "[t]he combination of familiar elements according
to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than
yield predictable results., 41 The Court also validated the "obvious to

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

KSR, 550 U.S. at 427.
Id. at 409-10.
Id.at 412.
Id.
Id. at 418.

40.

Id.

41. KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
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try" doctrine by finding that one of reasonable skill in the 42
art will
likely try a "finite number of identified, predictable solutions.,
It seems the Court deliberately chose to forego issuing a clear
test in favor of a more flexible standard. The Court's decision to
create trial court discretion may undermine the actual impact of KSR.
While KSR broadens the type of evidence available to trial courts in
obviousness litigation, it leaves considerable power to the Federal
Circuit to shape the future of non-obviousness law.4
B. Courts Apply KSR Non-Uniformly Across Industries
The Federal Circuit has exhibited apathy toward the changes
mandated in KSR. One court has even upheld a jury instruction
requiring the jury to find motivation to combine before finding the
patent obvious.44 In addition, Chief Judge Michel of the Federal
Circuit has noted that the KSR decision did not actually create a new
test, settle confusion, or provide any useful formula. 45 According to
Judge Michel, the TSM test was always intended to be a method of
carrying out the test prescribed in Graham.46
In response to
assertions that KSR created a more "flexible" standard, Chief Judge
Michel expressed discontent: "What is that? One that floats up and
down and changes with the season?, 4' Apparently, the Federal
Circuit may not intend to significantly alter its approach in resolving
non-obviousness cases.
Some critics assert that the KSR decision was an anomaly
because the simplicity of the technology at issue did not provide an
adequate dispute about the Graham factors. 8 Chief Judge Michel
noted that the facts were "too easy, too black and white. 4 1 While
juries can readily make appropriate findings of fact in such a simple
mechanical case, they may have much more difficulty when
confronted with subject matter in the life sciences, organic chemistry,

42. Id. at 419-21.
43. Justin Lee, ANNUAL REVIEW 2008: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENT: Note: How KSR Broadens (Without Lowering) the Evidentiary Standard of
Nonobviousness, 23 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 15, 15 (2008).
44.
45.
46.

Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave. Inc., 511 F.3d 1157, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
ParadigmShift, supra note 5.
Id.

47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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or molecular biology.' Because organic chemistry inherently involves
a finite number of combinations, a broad reading of KSR could

arguably render the entire field "obvious."'
According to the
Federal Circuit, "in cases involving new chemical compounds, it
remains necessary to identify some reason which would have led a
chemist to modify a known compound in a particular manner
to
52
compound.claimed
newly
a
of
obviousness
facie
prima
establish
Subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have provided conflicting
results. While it appears that courts are more likely to find
mechanical patents obvious, it is uncertain what effect KSR will have
on pharmaceutical and biotech patents. Two recent cases involving
mechanical patents, Leapfrog Entertainment,Inc. v. Fisher-Price,Inc.
and In re ICON Health & Fitness, highlight relatively simple
technologies that courts can readily consider under KSR. 53 In
Leapfrog, the court found that a prior mechanical device and modern
electronic 4 device contained all the claims limitations except for a
"reader." , Because readers were well known in the art and used in
several other toys, the court found that the combination was
obvious.?5 In ICON Health & Fitness the claims were obvious because
it combined a folding treadmill with a spring mechanism for a folding
bed. Since the folding bed addressed the same problem as a folding
treadmill, it was analogous prior art."6 In addition, the Federal Circuit
in In re Comiskey articulated a rule that may make it more difficult
for patentees to patent old mechanical inventions that incorporate
modern electronics.5 According to the In re Comiskey court, "the
routine addition of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable
invention typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness. '"5"

50. Tony Dutra, Experts Identify Patent Issues Ripe for Judicial Clarification,76 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 138 (2008)
51. Id.
52. Takeda Chem. Indus. Ltd. V. Alphapharm Pty. Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
53. See Leapfrog Entertainment, Inc. v. Fisher-Price,Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1158 (Fed.

Cir. 2007) (an "interactive learning device" that helped children to read phonetically); In
re ICON Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (treadmill with a folding
base and spring mechanism to hold the base in an upright position).
54. Leapfrog Entertainment,Inc., 485 F.3d at 1162.
55. Id.

56. ICON Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1381.
57. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
58. Id.
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While it is fairly straightforward for a court to predict
obviousness in the context of mechanical devices, the problem is
arguably much more complicated in the pharmaceutical arts. Shortly
before KSR the Federal Circuit decided Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.;
after KSR the Federal Circuit denied rehearing en banc.59 In Pfizer
the patentee tested a limited number of salts and found that one had
unexpected superior results."' Despite the unpredictability of the
chemical changes, the federal circuit observed that prior case law
disfavored routine testing and held that the claimed invention was
obvious.'
In Takeda, however, the Federal Circuit held that the patent at
issue did not involve a finite number of solutions, as in Pfizer, and the
patented product was therefore not obvious. 2 The court required a
"reason that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound
in a particular manner." 3 Simply replacing "reason" with "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" would produce the old TSM test and
indicate that the test was still applied rigidly in the chemical arts.64
In PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., the Federal
Circuit overruled a jury's finding of non-obviousness in a case in
which the accused infringers even praised the inventors as "pioneers"
in the field.6 The court found that using stem cells to treat persons
with compromised blood and immune systems was obvious because
there was a reasonable expectation of success in light of prior art
teachings and suggestions." PharmaStem shows that the Federal
Circuit may be overturning jury verdicts in biochemical cases based
on a liberal construction of KSR.
There is no way to quantify the implications of KSR, but it
appears that the decision made it easier to invalidate a patent based
on obviousness. How the lower courts construe the decision will
shape the extent to which it is easier to invalidate a patent upon a
finding of obviousness. Based on recent decisions, KSR appears to
apply more clearly to mechanical patents since the Federal Circuit

59. Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1367.
Id.
Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1350.
Id. at 1358

64. Lee, supra, note 43 at 39.
65. PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
66. Id.
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seems unwilling to stray substantially from its prior precedent in
pharmaceutical patents.
C.

Judges Have Differing Opinions Regarding the Effect of KSR on
Summary Judgment

In KSR the Federal Circuit overturned the district court's
summary judgment motion because conflicting expert testimony
raised a genuine issue of material fact.67 The conflicting expert
testimony came from two Teleflex experts who asserted that the
location of the sensor was a "simple, elegant, and novel
combination.""'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
conclusory affidavits on the question of obviousness cannot prevent
summary judgment because it is a legal conclusion."
Some believe that the number of summary judgment motions on
obviousness will increase and that KSR is the key to "an efficient
method for challenging questionable patents." '
Former Judge
Roderick R. McKelvie of the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, and Senior Judge Thomas S. Ellis of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, agree that
KSR would likely result in more motions for summary judgment
being granted. 7 ' However, Chief Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit
disagrees, predicting that at the trial level the number of summary
judgment motions being granted will not change significantly, but that
there may be an increase in post-trial Rule 50 motions for judgment
as a matter of law. 2
In Omegaflex, Inc. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp, a decision by Chief
Judge Michel, the Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary
judgment based on conflicting expert testimony. In Omegaflex the
expert testimony consisted of an expert asserting that one of skill in
the art would have "recognized the importance of proper alignment"
and would have been motivated to use a "locating sleeve.",74 Chief
67.

Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 289-90 (2005).

68. Id.

69. KSR, 550 U.S. at 425-26.
70. Lee, supra, note 43, at 43 (citing John F. Duffy, Commentary, KSR v. Teleflex:
PredictableReform of Patent Substance and Procedurein the Judiciary, 106 Mich. L. Rev.
First Impressions 34, 37 (2007)).
71. Id.
72. ParadigmShift, supra note 5.
73. Omegaflex, Inc. v. Parker-HannifinCorp., 243 F. App'x 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(non-precedential).
74. Id at 596.
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Judge Michel's prediction and the Federal Circuit's decision in
Omegaflex comport with the traditional method of adjudicating
obviousness at the trial level-rarely removing the initial
determination from the jury.
IV. Options for Jury Instructions Which Satisfy the
Requirements of KSR
Several jury instructions have surfaced that are acceptable under
KSR due at least in part to the open-ended nature the decision.
Presently, jury instructions on non-obviousness exist in three basic
forms. The vast majority of courts employ general verdict forms in
instructing juries to determine the question of non-obviousness. 7' In
other instances a court may employ a special verdict form that
instructs the jury to articulate specific findings corresponding to the
Graham factors and other considerations.6 Finally, a court may
employ a verdict form that instructs the jury to make the same factual
findings corresponding to the Graham factors and other
considerations, but leaves the ultimate non-obviousness decision to
the judge."
A. Most Jurisdictions Have Not Modified Their Jury Instructions to
Conform to KSR
KSR is still a very recent decision and many jurisdictions have
not modified their jury instructions. 7" However, most of the pre-KSR
jury instructions incorporate the Graham factors and comply fairly
closely with the requirements in KSR.7 While various jurisdictions
have not modified their official jury instructions, nothing prevents
district courts from making small modifications to include the proper
KSR standards.8 "
The Eleventh Circuit's jury instructions set out the statutory
obviousness requirement, define the concept of "prior art," and

75. See Lee et al., supra note 9.

76. See, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Model Patent Jury
Instructions, supra note 8.
77. See id.

78. See, e.g., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions
(Civil Cases), supra note 8 at 386-87.
79. See id.
80. Power Integrations,Inc. v. FairchildSemiconductor Int'l, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 562,

567 (D. Del. 2008) (court modified model jury instructions to conform with KSR by
eliminating teaching, suggestion or motivation requirement).
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instruct the jury to consider secondary considerations> The relevant
secondary considerations include a long-felt need, others' failed
attempts, commercial success, consent decrees and licenses, and the
defendant's alleged copying. By comparison, while requiring the
same consideration of the Graham primary and secondary
considerations, the Fifth Circuit's jury instructions also caution jury's
against using hindsight bias. However, the instructions still require a
motivation to combine when obviousness is based on a combination
of prior art references. 4 Like the Eleventh Circuit and Fifth Circuit,
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware's jury
instructions require a jury to consider the Graham primary factors
and secondary considerations." However, contrary to KSR, the
District of Delaware's jury instructions reject the "obvious to try"
standards. s6
B. Post-KSR Jury Instructions Provide Several Options for
Conforming to KSR
The Northern District of California was one of the first to issue
new, post-KSR jury instructions. These instructions give judges a
choice of two alternative instructions, and provide corresponding jury
verdict forms.8 Effectively, these instructions give judges a choice:
Judges may use the jury only to make specific findings of fact and
leave the legal determination of obviousness for the judge, or the
judge may follow the traditional approach of requiring the jury make
specific findings of fact in addition to making the legal determination
of obviousness. Both instructions provide the statutory requirements
and instruct the jury to conclude whether the primary and secondary
considerations of Graham are present.8
The secondary
considerations the jury must consider include commercial success,
long-felt need, others' failed attempts, defendant's alleged copying,
81. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil
Cases), supra note 8 at 386-87.

82. Id.
83. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions in Civil
Cases, supra note 8 at § 9.5.
84. Id.
85. United States District Court for the

District of Delaware, Uniform Jury

Instructions for Patent Cases, supra note 8 at § 4.8.
86. Id.
87. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Model Patent Jury
Instructions, supra note 8.
88. Id.
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unexpected superior results, acceptance and praise from others in the
field, independent invention of the claimed invention by others at or
around the time the claimed invention was made, and other evidence
showing obviousness or non-obviousness." However, one of the jury
instructions stops there and leaves the ultimate obviousness
determination for the judge. 9 The other jury instruction provides
additional guidelines to enable the jury to resolve the obviousness
question, such as instructing the jury to avoid hindsight bias while
considering whether the invention was obvious to try.9' The Northern
District of California provides two model jury verdict forms
corresponding to these two jury instructions.9' Both forms require
specific findings of fact as to the Graham factors and secondary
considerations of fact, but the second form requires an actual finding
of obviousness. 9' In this way, the Northern District of California
provides a choice for judges as to the legal application of KSR and the
extent to which the jury is involved in the ultimate finding of
obviousness.
The American
Intellectual Property Law Association
("AIPLA") and the Federal Circuit Bar Association ("FCBA") have
also promulgated model jury instructions.
The AIPLA's jury
instructions are similar to the Northern District of California's jury
instructions, allowing the judge to choose between two jury
instructions. 4 A first AIPLA jury instruction asks the jury only to
make factual findings, thus leaving the legal determination of
obviousness to the judge; a second AIPLA jury instruction directs the
jury to make the final determination of obviousness in view of the
jury's factual findings.)5 The FCBA's jury instructions incorporate the
standard Graham factors and additional information gleaned from
KSR, including the "obvious to try" standard, and ultimately instruct
the jury to make the final obviousness determination. 9

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 57-59.
93. Id.
94. American Intellectual Property Law Association, Model Patent Jury Instructions,
supra note 8.
95. Id.
96. Federal Circuit Bar Association, Model Patent Jury Instructions, supra note 8 at §

4.3b, pg. 43-51.
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Upon Federal Circuit Chief Judge Michel's request, the National
Patent Jury Instruction Project recently developed new jury
instructions for patent infringement cases.
The Federal Circuit,
however, has not endorsed these jury instructions." The instructions
allow for two alternative instructions very similar to those provided
by the Northern District of California's jury instructions.
While
emphasizing the factual nature of the inquiry, however, the
committee that formed the new jury instructions did not include a
special verdict form requiring the jury to articulate its factual
findings. I.

At least one court has specifically modified a jury instruction for
use in the biotech arts."1 The court issued a jury instruction that
includes the "obvious to try" standard set out in KSR.1 12 Recognizing
problems associated with hindsight bias in the biological arts, where
at least some ideas are derived from a limited number of possibilities,
the court added: "in arts such as biotechnology, which are not
generally predictable, [the defendant] must also prove that one skilled
in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in
pursuing the options available to him at the time in order for you to
conclude that selecting any such option would have been obvious."""°
Despite the changes mandated by KSR, many courts use old jury
instructions that do not account for KSR's new, more flexible
standard. While previous jury instructions typically require the jury
to consider the Graham factors, only post-KSR jury instructions have
implemented the "obvious to try" standard laid out by the United
States Supreme Court in KSR. This information raises the question,
have court actually modified verdict forms to reflect the KSR
decision?
C.

Few Courts Require Special Verdict Forms

Early studies suggest most district courts use general verdict
forms rather than special verdict forms, which require juries to
97. Bass et al., Model Patent Jury Instructions (Dec. 5 2008), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patentjuryinst.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
98. Id. at

1.

99. See id. at 42-46.
100. Id.
101.

See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories Inc., D. Md., No. AW-96-4080,

5/16/07.
102. Biotech Firm Wins Jury Verdict Following Post-KSR Instruction on 'Obvious-toTry', 74 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 141 (2007).
103. Id.
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enumerate their factual findings. 114 The study compared seventeen
jury verdict forms between the issuance of the KSR decision and
January 17, 2008."" Of the seventeen jury verdict forms, thirteen jury
verdict forms not only asked juries to make the ultimate obviousness
decision, but also used a general verdict form that did not require
juries to enumerate their factual findings with respect to the Graham
factors or secondary considerations."" Four jury verdict forms did not
require the jury to make a finding on obviousness, leaving the
decision of obviousness for the court. Of these four jury verdict
forms, only one followed the Northern District of California's
approach, setting forth
several factual questions to the jury in a
17
0
form.
verdict
special
V. The Continuing Role of Juries in Non-Obviousness
Decisions
Many bodies of law deal with a common dilemma: who should
decide a legal question based on a factual inquiry? The answer varies
across differing legal regimes. For example, in patent disputes the
judge alone is responsible for determining claim construction, even
though the decision may involve several factual inquiries.
Juries,
however, are responsible for claim construction in real property law.1'(
Though placing the obviousness inquiry into the hands of a judge may
potentially improve the patent system, such a change should not be
advocated lightly.
Completely removing the obviousness
determination from the province of the jury may not cure the
inefficiency
and
unpredictability
characteristics
of
jury
determinations.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Lee et al., supra note 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.

108. While the Federal Circuit has been reluctant to expressly classify claim
construction as a legal question based on fact, others have had no problem in doing so.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (1995) (Mayer, J.,
concurring).
109. Paul M. Shoenhard, Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real PropertyPrinciples to
Guide Federal Circuit Patent Jurisprudence,17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 299, 332-33 (2007) (noting the similarities in real property claim construction and
patent claim construction).
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A. Completely Removing the Obviousness Determination from the
Province of the Jury is Not the Solution
According to popular perception, a jury is more likely to find in
favor of a patentee and grant higher damages than a judge.""
Common complaints about juror competence include: juries are
unable to comprehend the technology or the legal requirements for
patent validity and infringement; juries are pro-patentee and have a
higher regard for the United States Patent and Trademark Office;
juries are biased in favor of domestic companies; juries award
excessively high damage awards; and juries are easily swayed by
tangential factors." The combination of a "blue ribbon" on the cover
of a patent, the fact that a patent application is reviewed by an
"expert agency" with "technically trained examiners," and the
presumption of validity afforded to issued patent applications may
lead juries to exhibit undue deference to the patentee."'
Empirical studies on jury performance in patent disputes are
uncommon. In other areas of law, commentators use several methods
of comparing the performance of judges and juries. Those methods
include asking judges to indicate their agreements or disagreements
with respect to decisions made by juries, comparing outcomes upon
an investigation of bench trials and jury trials, and using experimental
simulations."' Unfortunately, archival studies of actual patent cases
are the only significant studies conducted on jury obviousness
determinations.
1.

Win Rates and All-or-Nothing Decisions

In one of the most comprehensive studies conducted on jury bias,
Kimberly Moore investigated 1411 cases between 1983 and 1999.114
The study applied a theoretical model, which assumes-considering
the relevant biases of judge and jury-that litigants will settle all cases
where the probability of winning was significantly different than 50-

110. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases - An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 369 (2000-2001).
111. Id. (internal citations omitted).
112. Id.at372-73.
113. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Jury Decisionmaking: Evaluating Juries by Comparison
to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. UL. REV. 469,472-76 (2005).
114. Of the 1411 trials, the fact finder resolved 1209 cases, resulting in 533 jury trials
and 676 bench trials. Robbennolt, supra note 113 at 380 (internal citations omitted).
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percent, resulting in a theoretical 50-percent win rate for the patentee
and 50-percent for the alleged infringer."'
The data in the Moore study indicated an overall win rate of 58percent for the patentee, with a 68-percent win rate in jury decisions
and a 51-percent win rate in judge decisions."
Additionally, when
viewed on a yearly basis, the win rate in a bench trial remained
relatively constant while the win rate in a jury trial fluctuated over
time.
Moore speculated that the win rates for bench trials were
closer to 50-percent because the win rate varied less over the course
of the year and parties could more accurately estimate their chances
of prevailing, enabling them to determine whether to settle the suit
before trial."' On its face, this appears to be significant evidence
supporting the popular view, namely that a jury is more likely to find
in favor of a patentee. However, when the study compared the
individual issues of validity, enforceability, and infringement, the
differences were still apparent, albeit less dramatic."9
Moore also compared win rates when a jury decides upon
multiple issues and when the accused infringer files a suit for
declaratory judgment of non-infringement or invalidity. The study
showed that when juries consider both validity and infringement, they
found both issues for the same party at a much higher rate than a
judge, indicating that the jury's decision on complex issues may
become influenced by the tendency to rule in an "all or nothing"
fashion.1 2" The survey indicated similar results when deciding a case
with multiple patents.1 2' Additionally, judges found in favor of

115. While many other empirical studies do not substantiate the 50-percent prediction,

the ones that do conform most closely to a number of assumptions proposed in the
Priest/Klein model. The assumptions are: damages are stipulated and only liability is in
issue, equal stakes, symmetrical information, risk neutrality, and lack of strategic behavior.

Id. at 376-77 (internal citations omitted).
116. Id. at 386. The study also considered win rates on a claim-by-claim basis and
found no significant difference. On a claim-by-claim basis, the win rates were 63-percent
and 49-percent, for the jury and judge, respectively. Id.
117. Id. at 388.

118. Id. However, if this were true, there is no reason why the error would be
systematically skewed in one direction or the other. Id.
119. The patentee win rates for jury and judge respectively were: validity 71-percent
and 64-percent, enforceability 75-percent and 72-percent, infringement 71 -percent and 59percent, and willfulness 71 -percent and 53-percent. Id. at 390.
120. Robbennolt, supra note 113 at 403 (finding jury verdicts for the same party 86-

percent of the time, while bench verdicts for the same party only 74-percent of the time).
121. Id. at 404 (finding jury verdicts for the same party 87-percent of the time, while
bench verdicts for the same party only 72-percent of the time).
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patentees most of the time-regardless of whether the patentee was
first to bring suit on infringement or the alleged infringer filed suit for

declaratory judgment-while juries found more often for the party
who was first to bring suit. 1 2 Moreover, for patent validity, juries

found for the patentee 76-percent of the time when the patentee was
first to bring suit, and only 40-percent of the time for the patentee
123
when the alleged infringer filed suit for declaratory judgment.
2.

Who isMore Accurate?

The other piece of the puzzle is the appeal affirmance rate.
Different studies have shown varying overall affirmance statistics for
decisions appealed to the Federal Circuit. One study conducted by
Christian Chu showed 52-percent affirmance for summary judgments,
45-percent for jury trials and 56-percent for bench trials.124 After
performing a chi-square test, the p-value was 0.00082, allowing Chu to
say with 99-percent confidence that the type of judgment appealed
can predict the likelihood of reversal or affirmance by the Federal
Circuit. 12

By contrast, Moore's

study found that the overall

affirmance rate was 78-percent for both bench and jury trials, and that
there was no significant difference for validity, infringement, or
enforceability. 6 The differences may stem from the fact that the
studies covered different periods of time or used slightly different
statistical methods. Chu's study indicates that the Federal Circuit
agrees with judges more often.
Moore's study, however, appears to indicate a jury may be just as
competent as a judge in evaluating patent cases. Nevertheless, it is
important to consider the record the judge and jury each provide for
the Federal Circuit to review. While the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require judges to articulate their findings of fact and
conclusions of law, most jury verdict forms are black box forms that
do not require juries to articulate their findings.
When reviewing a
black box verdict form, the Federal Circuit must presume the jury

122. Id. at 406 (finding jury verdicts for the patentee 68-percent of the time when
patentee filed and only 38-percent of the time when the alleged infringer filed a
declaratory judgment).
123. Id.

124. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.1075,1109 (2001).
125. Id. at 1109-10.
126. Moore, supra note 110 at 398-99.
127. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Moore, supra note 110 at 401.
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found all of the facts in the record in support of the chosen verdict.
For this reason, it is much more difficult for the Federal Circuit to
overturn a jury verdict than a bench verdict. Moore suggests that
affirmance statistics may not be an accurate rating of how well a jury
performs, and that the actual affirmance rating may be significantly
129
lower if the Federal Circuit knew the basis for a jury's decision.
The above studies confirm many common fears about jury trials
in the context of patent cases. Juries tend to find for plaintiffs
(patentees or alleged infringers) more often than judges find for
plaintiffs.
While results for affirmance studies lead to mixed
conclusions, both the Moore and Chu studies suggest that a problem
may exist, as indicated by jury trial affirmance ratings. Accordingly,
the patent system may be improved by shifting the responsibility for
obviousness determinations from the jury to the judge.
3.

Taking the Entire Decision Away from the Jury is Too Drastic

The extent of jury involvement in the obviousness determination
remains contentious in the wake of the KSR decision because
obviousness is ultimately a legal determination that may be based on
questions of fact.1"' Traditionally, trial courts resolve this conflict by
ruling on allegations of patent obviousness in motions for judgment as
a matter of law.'3 ' The Northern District of California instructs the
jury to make factual findings, and gives the judge the option of
deciding the obviousness question or passing it on to the jury.13 2 Still
others advocate taking the entire process out of the jury's hands.3'
In patent claim construction, early courts would often leave
questions of fact relevant to claim construction for the jury.' 34 Over
time, when it became apparent that juries were not up to the task of
claim construction, judges began providing juries with their
interpretations of patent claims that the juries were to use in
determining patent infringement or invalidity. 3 5 Early courts justified
this practice as an exception to the Seventh Amendment, reasoning

128. Id. (citing Jurgensv. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
129. Id.
130. KSR, 550 U.S. at 425-26.
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
132. See notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
133. See Brief of Cisco Systems, Inc. et al as Amici Curaie in Support of Reversal, KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), at 9-10.
134. Id. at 332 (citing Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. 218, 219 (1852)).
135. Id.
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that due process required a judge decide the issue because of the
complexity

of patent

suits. 116

The

Federal

Circuit

has

since

exception."' 37

condemned this "complexity
The Supreme Court,
however, has held that claim construction was an13 inquiry for the court
and ignored the apparent legal/factual problem.
In obviousness law, by contrast, the Supreme Court has classified
the question as one of law based on findings of fact.13 9 As a result, it is
likely that the Federal Circuit will not accept any kind of "complexity
exception" to the Seventh Amendment. Additionally, as discussed
above, since the Federal Circuit seems to be of the view that KSR did
not change much, it may be unwilling to endorse sweeping doctrinal
changes.
B. KSR Provides the Opportunity to Reduce Hindsight Bias by
Requiring Juries to Articulate their Factual Findings on a Special
Verdict Form
Most of the popular fears among patent practitioners can be
boiled down to the notion that juries are highly susceptible to
hindsight bias. Hindsight bias is the tendency for people who know
an outcome to falsely believe they could have predicted the
outcome. 1411 In addition to the legal world, hindsight bias is found in a
variety of applied settings including politics, historical judgment,
psychotherapy case histories, medical diagnoses, and employee
evaluation. 4' Efforts to curb hindsight bias in the legal setting have
proven mostly unsuccessful, but may be addressed by looking at other
settings that have seen success.
1. No Test or Jury Instruction has Succeeded in Reducing Hindsight
Bias
While many model jury instructions caution against hindsight
bias, evidence shows these warnings are often ineffective. '42 Mandel
conducted a study dividing participants into three groups, and asking
each to address two scenarios: a "baseball scenario," where the
136. Id.at 333.
137.

Id.

138. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996).
139. KSR, 550 U.S. at 427.
140. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 305
(1988).

141. Id.
142. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders PatentDecisions Irrational,67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006).
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invention involved a baseball teaching aid, and a "fishing lure
scenario," where the invention involved a new type of fishing lure.4

The first group-the foresight group-assessed whether a
hypothetical person would be able to solve the problem using only
the prior art and initial information. 144 The second group-the
hindsight group-simultaneously considered both the solution and
whether it was obvious.1 4' Finally, the third group-the debiasing
group-received the same information as the hindsight group,
with an
4
admonishment against using hindsight to reach the solution. 1
In the baseball scenario, 24-percent of the foresight group, 76percent of the hindsight group and 66-percent of the debiasing group
found the solution obvious] 47 In the fishing lure scenario, 23-percent
of the foresight group, 59-percent of the hindsight group, and 49percent of the debiasing group found the solution obvious.1 4' The
results suggest that hindsight bias is a significant problem, potentially
rendering jury verdicts unreliable. In Mandel's study, while the
instruction cautioning against the use of hindsight was helpful in
reducing the use of hindsight, it did not completely mitigate the
problem. Overall, the Mandell study suggests that hindsight bias
shifted about one-half and about one-third of mock juror decisions in
the baseball and fishing lure scenarios, respectively. 149 In addition,
while hindsight bias is a problem in many different legal regimes, it
appears to be a much greater problem in patent obviousness
determinations. 15°
143. The baseball scenario involved instructional materials for teaching people to
throw baseball pitches. The prior art described how to hold and release the ball, plastic
baseballs with indentations showing where to place one's fingers, and workshops where
people could go to learn. The inventor was asked to develop a new product that allowed
the student to hold a real baseball while learning but did not require individual instruction.
Id. at 1407. The Fishing lure scenario involved an inventor who was trying to make an

artificial fishing lure that would not lose its salty flavor or spoil in water. The prior art
included the following: an article which suggested adding flavor or odor of natural bait to
lures; a patent on a lure made of squirrel hair with yeast and salt baked in to emit an odor;
a book which noted that fish could "taste" bait before biting, and recommended using
salted pork rinds as bait; and an entry in Field Sports Almanac that described using salted
minnows as bait. Id. at 1407-08.
144. Id. at 1408.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1409.
148. Id.
149. Mandel, supranote 142 at n. 63.
150. Id., see also, Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.

777, 818 (2001)

(24-percent of judges shifted decision in section 1983 scenario in
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Additionally, group studies suggest that jury deliberation in a
group setting does not significantly reduce a jury's use of hindsight

bias. One study, where individuals were first asked to record their
individual verdicts and then allowed to deliberate in a group, found
no significant difference between an individual's use of hindsight and
the group's use of hindsight. 15' Another study, where researchers
asked participants to make judgments "as if they had known the
outcome," found no significant difference between an Iindividual
2
participant's use of hindsight and a group's use of hindsight.
Unfortunately, some studies suggest hindsight bias also has a
significant effect on judges.'13 For this reason, giving the obviousness
decision to the judge will not significantly reduce the problem of
hindsight bias. However, other studies suggest individuals familiar
with a task demonstrate slightly less hindsight bias. 4 At best, judges
will exhibit only slightly less hindsight bias, but without further
studies the extent of this effect is unclear.
Both the secondary considerations of Graham and the Federal
Circuit's TSM test attempted to curb hindsight bias..5 To investigate

hindsight); Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on
Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 606 (1999)
(24-percent of mock jurors shifted decision concerning punitive damages); Kim A. Kamin
& Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ? Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 89, 98 (1995) (34-percent of mock jurors shifted decision concerning
negligence); Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias
Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 671, 679 (1998) (28percent of mock jurors shifted decision concerning negligence).
151. Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some
Problems in Learningfrom Experience, 31 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 628, 637 (1988).
152. Dagmar Stahlberg et al., We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46, 49 (1995). The only
significant difference was that the group had a better ability to recall than the individual.
Mandel, supra, note 142 at n. 80. This difference would only ameliorate the problem of
hindsight bias when the task is to recall a prior judgment and would not exist in nonobviousness determinations where there is no prior judgment. Id.
153. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 214-15 (1998) (finding no statistically significant
differences between the rate that judges and juries find a patent obvious); Chris Guthrie et
al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 803, 818 (2001) (study revealed
judges demonstrate less susceptibility to certain cognitive illusions, but not to hindsight
bias).
154. Jay J. J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The HindsightBias: A
Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 155
(1991).
155. Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (1999) ("The best
defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness
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the impact of both tests, Mandel conducted another study using two
versions of the baseball scenario from his previous survey.

56

The first

version was unmodified; the second, modified version included a
single explicit suggestion to combine prior art from the inventor's
supervisor.1
In this study Mandel divided test subjects into the
foresight group and the hindsight group 85' Within these groups
Mandel further divided subjects into sub-groups in which subjects
were either given the modified or unmodified version of the scenario.
In each of those sub-groups, subjects were instructed to make an
obviousness determination in view of a) no instruction, b) the TSM
test, or c) the Graham test.'
The results are summarized in the
following table from Mandel's study:""
Suggestion

Instruction

N

No

None

55

Yes

None

55

in scenario
Foresight

Obvious

Confidence

Likelihood

(freq.)

(mean)

(mean)

23

68.73

4.78

(42%)

71.00

4.94

27
(49%)

Hindsight

No

None

55

39

74.55

5.38

Yes

None

53

(71%)

74.91

5.77

No

Suggestion

55

45

71.45

5.56

Yes

Suggestion

56

(85%)

71.79

5.42

No

Graham

55

45

74.91

5.65

(83%)
42
(75%)

43
(78%)

analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or
motivation to combine prior art references.")
156. See Mandel, supra note 142.
157. Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight
Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 13 (2006).
158. Id. at 14-15.
159. The foresight group was given all the basic lead-up information and asked
whether a solution would be obvious. The hindsight group was also given the actual
invention and asked whether that invention was obvious. The suggestion instruction
group was given the same information as the hindsight group but also informed of the
TSM test and instructed to implement it. The Graham instruction group was identical to
the hindsight group, but contained instructions about the Graham requirements and
instructed the juror to follow those requirements. Id.
160. Id. at 16.
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The results suggest that neither the Graham test nor the TSM
to significantly decrease the amount of hindsight bias. '1'
able
was
2.

Psychologists Have Found that Subjects Who Articulate a Rationale
for Their Decisions Exhibit Less Hindsight Bias

Given that the numerous judicial tests designed by courts to curb
hindsight bias may be ineffective, hindsight bias may appear to be an
unsolvable problem in obviousness determinations. However, a
solution may lie in a psychological study by Arkes et al. (the "Arkes
study" herein), the results of which suggest that subjects exhibit less
hindsight bias when they articulate the rationale for their
conclusions.1 2 In the Arkes study, researchers divided participating
psychologists into eight groups of 60 psychologists.163 The researchers
provided a "foresight" group with a fact pattern about a patient and
asked them to assign a probability that the patient suffered from
three different conditions. 64 The researchers then provided each of
three "hindsight" groups with the same fact pattern, with the added
datum that the patient actually had a primary diagnosis of one of the
three conditions.16' A "foresight-reasons" group received the same
fact pattern as the foresight group with an additional requirement to
give reasons for their decisions. 66 Finally, three "hindsight-reasons"
groups considered the same fact pattern as the hindsight groups, and
were asked by the researchers to give reasons for their decisions. 16
The study showed that 58% of the hindsight subjects gave a higher
probability estimate to the correct diagnosis than the corresponding
estimate from the foresight group. 6 ' By contrast, only 41% of the
hindsight-reasons group gave a higher probability estimate to the

161. See Mandel, supra note 157 at 16.
162. Arkes et al., supra note 140 at 305.
163. The subjects were taken randomly from a list compiled of all psychologists in the
United States who indicated neuropsychology as a primary field or area of specialization.
Of the persons, the majority were engaged in clinical practice, the majority were men,
94% had a Ph.D. degree, and 3% were diplomats in neuropsychology. 480 subjects were
taken randomly, divided into eight groups of 60, and mailed the study. Id. at 306.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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correct diagnosis than the corresponding estimate from the foresightreasons group. 169
Though conducted in a different field of study and on subjects
who are much different than typical jurors, the Arkes study indicates
that requiring people to articulate the reasons for their decisions
reduces hindsight bias. Therefore, using a special verdict form and
requiring the jury to articulate its reasons in reference to the Graham
factors may reduce hindsight bias in non-obviousness decisions.
C.

A New Solution to Hindsight Bias Using KSR's Framework

The Mandel studies show that juries (even judges) are
susceptible to significant hindsight bias and that such bias will be
present even after instructing them on either the Graham factors or
the Federal Circuit's TSM test. As judges are also vulnerable to
hindsight bias, simply requiring the court to make the entire
determination would not solve the problem. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court's renewal of the Graham factors in KSR alone will
not significantly reduce the amount of hindsight bias. A solution to
mitigating the problem of hindsight bias may be to modify jury
instructions to require juries to articulate their factual findings. Some
jurisdictions have implemented such modifications to their jury
instructions.' 71 Others should follow.
1. Requiring Juries to Articulate Findings of Fact
Both of the alternative jury instructions for the Northern District
of California contain a jury verdict form requiring the jury to clearly7
define its factual findings with respect to the Graham factors. 1
Considering the complexity of patent cases, it is surprising that juries
are not already required to articulate their factual findings.
Furthermore, the Arkes study found that requiring subjects to
articulate their factual reasoning reduced hindsight bias.172 Similarly,
juries may employ less hindsight if they are required to explain their
reasoning using the Graham factors.
These types of instructions and verdict forms would also have the
added benefit of giving the Federal Circuit a clearer record to review

169. Arkes etal., supra note 140 at 307.
170. See U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Model Patent Jury
Instructions, supra note 8; Federal Circuit Bar Association, Model Patent Jury
Instructions, supra note 8.
171. Id.
172. Arkes et al., supra note 140 at 305.
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on appeal. The Moore study suggests that jury verdict affirmance
rates may be artificially higher than they should be because the
Federal Circuit does not know the factual findings most juries make,
forcing the Federal Circuit to assume that the jury found all relevant
facts in favor of the party who won.'17 Some may argue that reducing
affirmance rates would add even more uncertainty to patent suits.
However, in the long run, it would add stability to the patent system
because parties could benefit from insight into how juries make their
decisions and how the Federal Circuit treats such decisions.
Additionally, it may encourage settlement before appeal by allowing
parties to accurately predict their chances of winning on appeal.
2.

Dealing with Difficult-to-Answer GrahamFactors

Scholars have argued that it would be unduly difficult for a jury
to answer each of the obviousness factors of Graham.' 4 Other
experts have suggested that the jury can easily decide the two most
important factors of Graham, namely whether there was a long-felt
need and whether there was any evidence of teaching away.175
Additionally, KSR's new "obvious to try" standard may be one a jury
could easily address. Realistically, the jury's ability to accurately
answer the Graham factors will depend upon the patented
technology. For example, a jury could easily make a finding as to all
the primary and secondary factors of Graham in a case involving
relatively simple technology, such as the baseball or fishing lure
scenario Mandel used in his studies. However, juries will likely have
much more difficulty with technology involving organic chemistry,
biotech, or molecular biology.
There are various ways in which a court can address the problem
associated with the manner by which a jury addresses the obviousness
factors of Graham. One solution is for the court to allow the jury to
leave one or more of the Graham factors blank if they are too
difficult to answer. However, doing so would allow the jury to refuse
to answer most, if not all of the factual inquiries, and continue to
decide non-obviousness using hindsight. A better solution would be
for the court to provide all of the Graham factors to the jury, but give
the judge discretion in instructing the jury to return specific factual
findings in view of certain Graham factors. In doing so, the judge
would have the discretion to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether
173. Moore, supra note 110 at 401.
174. Dutra, supra, note 50.
175. Id.
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one or more of the Graham factors were impractical for the jury to
answer.

3.

Alternative: Bifurcate the Decision Process

Some jury instructions call for the jury to make specific factual
findings related to the Graham factors but reserve the ultimate
question of law for the judge.176 This would allow a jury to focus on
more narrow factual considerations rather than attempting to address
the larger obviousness determination. It is possible that the jury
would show less hindsight bias when deciding only specific factual
findings, and the judge would exhibit less hindsight bias because the
judge would make an objective legal decision based on established
facts. Further, since an individual familiar with a task may exhibit less
hindsight bias, a judge may be better equipped than a jury to deal
with hindsight bias.'
This approach, however, is controversial and
the Federal Circuit would likely not support it as an alternative to the
more traditional roles of judge and jury.

VI. Conclusion
The KSR Court attempted to clarify uncertainty in obviousness
law by striking down the strict application of the Federal Circuit's
TSM test and advocating a renewed appreciation for the Graham
factors. Unfortunately, the Court did not define a clear test for the
lower courts to use, which has led to conflicting interpretations,
particularly in the chemical and biochemical arts. It is unclear
whether judges will be granting more summary judgment motions,
and if they do, whether those orders will be reversed on appeal. This
uncertainty has led to several different jury instructions and
conflicting ideas about the effect of KSR.
While many jurisdictions have not altered their jury instructions
in view of KSR, the Northern District of California has provided two
alternatives. Both instructions charge the jury with specific factual
findings regarding the Graham factors and require a special verdict
form. One option allows the jury to adjudicate the entire nonobviousness decision, as is customary. The other option charges the
jury only with the specific factual findings, while leaving the ultimate
obviousness determination for the judge.
Concern about jury

176. See, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Model Patent Jury
Instructions, supra note 8.
177. See Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Willham, supra note 154.
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incompetence has led some to the proposition that non-obviousness
law may be improved by moving more responsibility from the jury to
the judge.
The concerns associated with the jury's role in determining
obviousness include juries generally having a pro-plaintiff bias, a
propensity toward awarding higher damages and an inability to
comprehend legal standards. While certain studies have provided
mixed results, other studies suggest that the judge may be better
equipped to adjudicate non-obviousness determinations. This would
indicate the non-obviousness decision should be removed from the
province of the jury. However, based on Federal Circuit precedent
and commentary, it appears that the Federal Circuit may be unwilling
to make such a sweeping change. Instead, jurisdictions should follow
the first variation of the Northern District of California's jury
instructions. By using this variation, the jury will determine nonobviousness, but a special verdict form will require them to articulate
their findings of fact with respect to the Graham factors.
While previous attempts to curb hindsight bias in patent law have
been ineffective, a study conducted by Arkes et al. suggests that
requiring subjects to articulate their rationale reduces the tendency to
succumb to the use of hindsight. Accordingly, by requiring a special
verdict form, jurors may decide the non-obviousness decision without
resorting to hindsight.
Given the disparity of jury instructions in various jurisdictions, it
is inevitable that the Federal Circuit will address the proper nonobviousness standard in the wake of KSR. Only time will tell which
of the interpretations discussed above will balance the concerns of the
KSR court and gain the blessing of the Federal Circuit. However,
until the Federal Circuit sets forth a non-obviousness standard,
jurisdictions should fashion their instructions after the first alternative
proposed by the Northern District of California, as it provides the
opportunity to reduce hindsight bias while staying true to the
requirements of KSR.

